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Network neuroscience represents the brain as a collection
of regions and inter-regional connections. Given its ability
to formalize systems-level models, network neuroscience
has generated unique explanations of neural function and
behavior. Themechanistic status of these explanations and
how they can contribute to and fit within the field of neu-
roscience as a whole has received careful treatment from
philosophers. However, these philosophical contributions
have not yet reachedmany neuroscientists. Here we com-
plement formal philosophical efforts by providing an applied
perspective from and for neuroscientists. We discuss the
mechanistic status of the explanations offered by network
neuroscience and how they contribute to, enhance, and in-
terdigitate with other types of explanations in neuroscience.
In doing so, we rely on philosophical work concerning the
role of causality, scale, and mechanisms in scientific expla-
nations. In particular, wemake the distinction between an
explanation and the evidence supporting that explanation,
and we argue for a scale-free nature of mechanistic explana-
tions. In the course of these discussions, we hope to provide
a useful applied framework in which network neuroscience
explanations can be exercised across scales and combined
with other fields of neuroscience to gain deeper insights into
the brain and behavior.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In contemporary scientific inquiry both within and beyond neuroscience, the term mechanism is often used when
referring to explanations of how the brain works beyond mere description, history, or teleology. We can describe
the brain’s white matter connections (description), how these connections have changed throughout evolution or
morph during development (history), and what these connections exist to do (teleology). But the answers to these
questions do not necessarily tell us howwhite matter works; a mechanistic explanation involves explaining howwhite
matter conducts, processes, and sends neural signals across the brain during a particular process. While a mechanistic
understanding of white matter involves mere description, history, and teleology, it also goes far beyond them [1, 2].
Fundamentally, neuroscientists seek mechanistic explanations of how the brain functions to support cognition
and behavior. Despite that shared goal, there remains broad disagreement in the field about exactly what types of
explanations aremechanistic. Such disagreement tends to hamper cross-disciplinary work, thereby hindering scientific
advances. It is therefore timely to consider complementary perspectives. Here we review philosophical work and
empirical evidence suggesting that much of the disagreement over the nature of mechanisms in neuroscience could be
diffused by (i) separating the notion of “mechanism” from that of “spatial scale” such that mechanisms can be identified
at many different spatial scales, and by (ii) establishing how correlative evidence can support mechanistic explanations.
In discussing the former, we summarize a working definition of mechanism that is independent of scale. By scale here,
wemean the size of the system’s components. In discussing the latter, we review evidence thatmechanistic explanations
can be used to provide predictions of a system’s structure or function, and we explain how such predictions can be
based on either correlative evidence or necessitative evidence (unfortunately often confused with causal evidence). A
definition of mechanism that is independent of both scale and the type of evidence will together allow us to link neurons
to regions, regions to whole brain dynamics, dynamics to cognition, and cognition to behavior.
In working through these preliminaries, we seek to lay down a foundation for understanding the specific contribu-
tions of the emerging field of network neuroscience to the broad and general goals of neuroscientific inquiry. Network
neuroscience stems from a thoughtful integration of themathematics of network sciencewith the biological field of
neuroscience in an effort to better understand the physical substrate and consequent function of themind. The under-
lying assumptions of the approach are that the brain can bemeaningfully separated into units (network nodes) with
well-defined interactions (network edges), and that the pattern of inter-unit interactions (network topology) enables
the rich complex dynamics observed in the brain to support cognitive function. Although we primarily focus on network
neuroscience at themacro-scale where we the authors most frequently contribute, we also consider the instantiation
of network neuroscience across a range of spatial scales, and its potential to offer both correlative and causal evidence.
Based on this discussion, we consider the types ofmechanistic explanations that network neuroscience can offer. Before
moving forward, it is critical to note that this work is not a technical or philosophical analysis or a reworking of scale,
causality, or mechanism. Instead, we seek to elucidate how the explanations of network neuroscience fit into amore
explicit account of neuroscientists’ common usage of the terms scale, causality, andmechanism by leveraging work on
these topics from the philosophy of science. Here, our main goal is to show how network neuroscience can provide
evidence for mechanistic explanations of the brain, going beyond mere description of the brain’s connections and
topology, primarily by clarifying the distinction between an explanation and the evidence supporting that explanation.
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F IGURE 1 A networkmodel of functional relationships between brain regions at the large scale in humans.
Each of the 400 brain regions is represented as a network node, which in turn is indicated in this figure by a colored
sphere. Each functional relationship between two brain regions is represented as a network edge, which in turn is
indicated in this figure by a colored line. a, Here color denotes the assignment of brain regions to putative functional
modules that support cognition. Anatomical locations of modules are represented by projecting the color of regions
onto the cortical surface of the brain. b, Here color denotes the strength of the participation coefficient, a measure of a
node’s connectivity tomany different modules. Nodes with high participation coefficients are called connector hubs. In
both of these layouts, nodes are treated as repellingmagnets connected by springs; in this physical representation,
nodes that are tightly connected cluster together. Note that connector hubs cluster together at the center of the
network, indicative of their role in integration and coordinating brain connectivity across modules.
2 | WHAT IS NETWORK NEUROSCIENCE?
Network neuroscience is an emerging field whose conceptual frameworks, mathematical underpinnings, and appli-
cations would require a book [3] or several books [4, 5, 6] to describe comprehensively. Indeed, a full introduction to
network neuroscience is beyond the scope here, and has been coveredwell elsewhere [3]. Here we provide a succinct
and non-comprehensive description that will allow a reader to understand the basics of the field and to evaluate our
later arguments and examples. Network neuroscience posits that the brain can be usefully represented as a collection
of two types of items: (i) nodes, which are typically regions of the brain, groups of neurons, or individual neurons,
and (ii) edges, which can either be structural connections, typically in the form of whitematter or axons, or statistical
dependencies, typically in the form of correlations in regional activity across time [7, 8]. We can decompose this basic
network into smaller sub-networks that we call communities or modules; each module is composed of nodes that
are more tightly interconnected to one another than to nodes in other modules. The division of nodes into modules
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allows us tomeasure the role that each node plays in the network topology. One particularly interesting statistic is the
participation coefficient, which measures how evenly spread a node’s connections are across modules. A node with
a high participation coefficient is called a connector hub. Specific analyses of the participation coefficient and other
network statistics are necessarily descriptive in nature. However, as wewill go on to explain, the networkmodel of the
brain and how it varies across individuals can be leveraged and combinedwith theory, computation, and other sources
of data, such as genetics, neurology, and behavior, to test mechanistic models of brain function.
3 | WHAT IS A MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION IN NEUROSCIENCE?
To contextualize this discussion,wenote that the philosophical debate concerningmechanisms is extremely robust. Here
we simply summarize a working definition that we view as having a broad consensus between and among philosophers
and neuroscientists. We restrict ourselves to features of a mechanistic explanation that are most immediately relevant,
but broader and deeper accounts of the topic are well established in the philosophy of science [1]. For further details,
we point interested readers to relevant and important debates concerning computational mechanisms [9], the existence
of mechanisms in dynamic complex systems [10], and the question of whethermechanisms are necessarily linked to
scientific realism [11].
3.1 | A neuroscientist’s working definition
To construct a mechanistic explanation of a system exhibiting a particular phenomenon, one must decompose that
system into its relevant parts and explain how they are organized aswell as how they interact to produce the phenomena
[12, 11, 13]. A mechanistic model explains a system’s phenomena in virtue of its parts, their operations, and their
organization, which can together produce the phenomena that is to be explained via a set of orchestrated interactions
[14]. Such explanations offer amechanism that must do the work in a causal way [15, 1], rather than arriving at the state
of “work done” via a set of correlative relations or temporal sequence of events. Finally, this explanationmust allow for
an accurate manipulation of the system [11]. Consider a dirt bike1. Force is created by the combustion in themotor and
enacted upon the crankshaft, which is connected to a front sprocket; via a chain, the force is transferred onto the rear
sprocket, which is connected to a hub, which, via spokes, is connected to a rim, which has a rubber tire mounted in it,
which has knobs that grip dirt. In this explanation, we describe the functional role of entities and causal mechanistic
relations between them (e.g., force is transferred between the two sprockets via a chain), rather thanmerely describing
physical characteristics of the entities (i.e., the sprockets are toothed aluminumwheels). We knowwhat a dirt bike was
built to do (its teleology: traverse dirt) and how it does so. Moreover, we can determine which part is broken based on
particular behaviors; if the front sprocket is spinning but not the rear sprocket, the chain is likely broken but themotor
is likely intact.
Neuroscientists in practice tend to adopt these requirements while defining amechanism. Across spatial scales of
inquiry, mechanistic explanations in neuroscience answer the question “How does the brain work?” in a similar manner
to howwewould answer the question “How does a dirt bike work?”. Wewill consider two examples: one at the large
scale, and one at the small scale. The first example is that of word learning in cognitive neuroscience. Wernicke’s area
has been associated with the comprehension of speech, whereas Broca’s area has been associated with the production
1Wenote that the dirt bike analogy differs from the brain in two key aspects: the dirt bike is linear while the brain is nonlinear, and the dirt bike is composed of
single-function components while the brain is composed of multi-function components; while these differences are intimately connected with reasons that
network tools are useful in neuroscience, we keep the analogy simple to ensure that our basic arguments are accessible to a broad readership. Moreover, one
of the authors (we leave it to the reader to deduce which) races dirt bikes, and thus the analogy is particularly apropos.
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of speech. Humans require both areas to learn a new word and to employ it, and therefore the physical connection
that allows the two regions to communicate, the arcuate fasciculus, is crucial [16]. Macaques, who do not have the
human capacity for spoken language, have an arcuate fasciculus, but it is not left-lateralized, and it is smaller than it is
in humans[17]. Damage to this connection is followed by an inability to learn newwords, and specific word learning
deficits can be traced to damage of Broca’s area,Wernike’s area, or the arcuate fasciculus, establishing that these areas
are necessary for the function. Moving beyond necessity to correlative evidence, recent studies have demonstrated that
humanswithmore robust whitematter tracts in the arcuate fasciculus exhibit better language learning abilities [18]
and this pathway strengthens during the development of language [19]. Together, these correlative and necessitative
results are consistent with (but do not prove) the casual mechanistic explanation that the arcuate fasciculus transfers
information during word learning.
It is important to note that this explanation glosses over, but depends on, smaller scale mechanistic explanations of
neural coding and communication. At this smaller scale, our second example is that of navigation. Different types of
cells in themedial entorhinal cortex represent different aspects of navigation via themechanism of feature detection of
the sensory cortices. Grid cells respond to the animal’s location in the environment, border cells express the animal’s
proximity to geometric borders, speed cells reflect the running speed of the animal, and head direction cells indicate the
orientation of the animal relative to landmarks in the environment [20]. Themechanism here is a neural mapping of the
animal moving in the world.
Note that in the two examples of mechanistic explanations we just discussed, there existed a notion of causality,
even though necessity, not causality, is observed. Scientists in general, including neuroscientists, typically emphasize
causality in mechanistic explanations [21, 22]. Similar to the manner in which a chain does the work of transferring
force, the arcuate fasciculus does the work of transmitting information during word learning, and grid cells do the
work of encoding location during navigation. Yet despite the fact that notions of causality rightly accompany notions
of mechanism, what neuroscientists unfortunately oftenmeanwhen they say causality is just necessity. If a region of
cortex is active during a cognitive process, and damage to that region impairs that cognitive process, we know that that
region is necessary for that cognitive process; inaccurately, the region is also sometimes described as the cause of that
cognitive process. It is critical to acknowledge that the notion of necessity is independent from the notion of causality,
and a necessary component of a process need not be amechanism. For example, if the only evidence that the arcuate
fasciculus transmits information during word learning was that damage to it impairs word learning, we would not have a
mechanistic model, just a necessary relationship between the arcuate fasciculus andword learning.
To have a mechanistic model, we need multiple lines of evidence, both from establishing necessity and finding
correlative evidence, as described above, because both lines provide evidence for a causal mechanism, even though
neither are identical with it. Returning to the dirt bike, it is one thing to know that the chain is necessary for the rear
wheel to spin. But so is the engine, the throttle, et cetera. It is critical to know that the speed of the chain correlates with
the rotational speed of the rear wheel. We need both to have a casual mechanism. Finally, it is important to realize that
ofttimes descriptions are a key component of a mechanism. It is not trivial to know that the front and rear sprockets are
connected via a chain, just as it is not trivial to know that Broca’s andWernike’s are connected via the arcuate fasciculus.
3.2 | Where our difficulties arise
Despite our quest for mechanisms, we as neuroscientists do not often employ technical definitions of them. We seem to
operate on some common and unspoken knowledge about what constitutes amechanism. We know onewhenwe see
one; or, at least whenwewant to. However, this approach tends to progenatemisunderstanding, bias, and confusion. An
important antidote is to appreciate howmechanistic can be defined, and how that definition might be distinct from
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notions of necessity and the spatial scale at which we each work. Drawing on efforts in the philosophy of science as well
as recent advances in network neuroscience, we summarize a notion ofmechanism that is supported by both correlative
and necessitative evidence and allows us to link work across scales andmethods.
3.2.1 | Causality
We aim to distinguish a mechanistic explanation from the source of evidence for it. To do so, wemust first make the
distinction between necessity and causality, which is a feature of amechanistic explanation. Althoughwe do not attempt
to define causality precisely here, knowledge of necessity is certainly not knowledge of causality. And even though
causality is a required feature of amechanistic explanation, a mechanistic explanation (or model) can be supported by
either correlative or necessitative evidence, or both. In other words, a mechanistic explanation is a model that we posit
to explain a system, and then we seek to obtain evidence of various kinds to support that model and to confirm its verity.
The distinction between an explanation and the evidence supporting that explanation is well known to philosophers
[2, 12, 23, 23, 24], but is less broadly appreciated by neuroscientists. Of course, as we outlined above, mechanistic
explanations rely on necessary relationships, and necessitative evidence is valuable. However, necessity, on its own, is
not causality, and correlative evidence can be just as valuable in supporting amechanistic model.
In neuroscience, an emphasis on so-called causal evidence has motivated lesion and ablation studies, as well as
stimulation and optogenetics studies. While important, such studies are less inherently valuable in and of themselves
than they are when performed explicitly to test a mechanistic explanation that has been formally constructed from
different types of evidence. For example, consider a thought experiment in which we destroy a particular brain region
that functional neuroimaging has implicated in a particular cognitive process. Because the animal would no longer be
able to engage in that cognitive process, one might (wrongly) say that we have uncovered evidence that that region
causes that function. However, this is where neuroscientists equating necessity with causality can lead to failure; it is
entirely possible that that region is in fact upstream of the region actually performing the relevant computation, and
thus the lesion study provides some evidence but not sufficient evidence for a causal mechanistic explanation. In the
parlance of our dirt bike analogy: if a dirt bike chain breaks and the rear wheel stops turning, we cannot with certainty
infer that the chain is generating force. Nor should we. One must measure the whole system to prevent inaccurate
inferences, and network approaches are oneway to do exactly that.
As an example, consider a model in which connector hubs integrate information andmaintain modular processing
in the brain. One could perform a between-subjects analysis to demonstrate that, when a network has strong connector
hubs, the network is more modular and cognitive performance is higher [25]. Moreover, when connector hubs are
damaged, modularity decreases [26] and cognitive deficits are widespread [27]. Such correlative evidence, particularly
when potential confounds aremodeled quasi-experimentally [28] and coupled with necessitative studies can strongly
serve to support amechanistic explanation. While lesion analyses demonstrate necessity, network analysis measures
the entire system; both can provide evidence in support of a mechanistic model, particularlywhen combined. In the final
section, we describe how this can occur in greater detail.
Obtaining correlative evidence for mechanistic explanations remains critical for the continued advancement
of science and may play an increasingly important role in neuroscience for two reasons. First, the types of data
available have changed fundamentally in their nature. Concerted efforts alignedwith federal and international funding
priorities have culminated in enormous repositories of brain, behavior, and genetic data from thousands of individuals
[29, 30]. Such data will be invaluable in constructing descriptive explanations, and in providing correlative evidence for
mechanistic explanations. Indeed, cognitive scientists now frequently go beyond the analysis of small datasets andwell-
controlled studies, instead analyzing large and complex observational data [31]. In meeting the opportunities that these
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new data bring, it may prove useful to learn from our colleagues in astronomy and astrophysics who generate large scale
observations from noisy data viewed from far away, and then use those observations to inform smaller-scale laboratory
experiments [31]. Mechanistic models can be built from the large scale observations and then confirmed in laboratory
experiments that exert greater control over the system [32, 33]. We envision such integration between large-scale data
analysis and small-scale laboratory experiments to become increasingly prevalent and fruitful in neuroscience.
The second reason that correlative evidence formechanistic explanationsmay play an increasingly important role in
neuroscience is that many phenomena – across all domains of biology – appear to be driven by network-level processes
[34, 33]. Understanding andmanipulating causal structures in such networks is an important area of ongoing research.
Yet, finding causality in any system is difficult, but defining causality in networks, isolating causal relations in networks,
and experimentally testing causal processes via finding necessitative relationships in networks is extremely difficult
[35]. To offer a bit of intuition, one simple difficulty lies in the question of whether specific edges or sets of edges within
the network are the true driving force, or whether themechanism is in fact an emergent property of the network as a
whole. Determining the answer to this questionmight require a combinatorially large set of experiments, which could
be impractical. A second notable difficulty lies in the fact that many networks associatedwith biological phenomena
are not simple tree-like structures, with linear paths alongwhich a causal chain can be identified, but instead contain
nontrivial clustering in addition to complex looped structures and cavities [36, 37, 38, 39]. While it remains important
to posit causal mechanistic models of network interactions, the predictions of thosemodels can be best evaluated in
large correlative analyses of expansive data sets; distinct necessitative manipulations can instead by used to probe
highly specific and constrained aspects of the network at a single time, informed by the large-scale correlative evidence.
Finally, some have questioned the value of network neurosciencemodels, and particularly the correlative nature
of models that describe the statistical dependency between activity time courses of two regions [15]. However, it has
beenwell argued that even though functional connectivity is not itself a mechanism, models of functional connectivity
can provide evidence for themechanisms that cause those correlations [33]. In other words, network neuroscience
models of functional connectivity can provide roughmechanistic approximations of the brain’s component parts and
interactions at a large scale [33]. A network edge defined by a correlation can do causal mechanistic work; and, a
causal mechanism can predict the presence of a correlation, which can then be observed in empirical data. Moreover,
network neuroscience explanations aremost satisfying when theymove beyond a static andmere description of the
network’s composition and organization. Ideally, suchmodels test mechanistic explanations of brain function by also
levering simulation and dynamical models [33, 40, 41], individual differences in network composition [25, 42], and lesion
analyses of the network [26, 27].
In summary, mechanistic models posit causal relationships between the organization of the system and the phe-
nomena to be explained. However, causality in the brain is quite opaque, and we typically inaccurately conflate causality
and necessity in neuroscience. Moreover, correlative evidence from networkmodels can certainly bear on the validity
of a mechanistic explanation that includes causal relationships, despite the fact that themodel’s organization and inter-
actions can be quantified from correlations. In particular, this approach is fruitful when combinedwith necessitative
analyses. Thus, the network perspective is increasingly critical to explaining brain function, as the global analyses that
can leverage large data sets can inform and constrain interpretations of more localized causal manipulations.
3.2.2 | Scale
When investigating a given system through the lens of science, we often either explicitly or implicitly choose the scale
at which we think we can gain amechanistic understanding. Ca2+ ions exist at a scale that might appear to be useful
for gaining amechanistic understanding of how neurons fire and thereby release neurotransmitters [43, 44]. Yet, this
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scale does not address themolecular composition and function of the active zone of a presynaptic nerve terminal, which
allows for the synaptic vesicle exocytosis that occurs when neurotransmitters are released [45, 46]. Similarly, this scale
does not address the cognitive context that can explain why neurons fire in a particular spatiotemporal pattern. In
fact, mechanistic explanations exist at each of these scales separately; no scale is privileged in its potential to offer a
mechanistic explanation [1].
Returning to the dirt bike analogy, force being transferred from the front sprocket to the rear sprocket via the chain
is a relatively high level explanation that does not involve the individual links of the chain or the number of teeth on the
sprocket, which determine how force is transferred, but it is also a lower level explanation than one addressing how the
chassis and engine work together to propel the bike across dirt. Despite differences in scale, all three explanations can
bemechanistic explanations. Similarly, an explanation of brain function involvingmultiple brain regions communicating
via white matter tracts and coordinated activity would not necessarily be any less mechanistic than an explanation
involving multiple cortical neurons communicating via axons and synapses. For example, consider explanations of
various features of visual perception. At amicroscale, primary visual cortex – the earliest cortical area associated with
the perceptual of visual stimuli – contains neurons that temporally coordinate their activity patterns to encode the
orientation of a stimulus [47]. At a macro-scale, information travels between the visual cortex and the posterior parietal
cortex [48, 49], the latter mediating selective attention tomotion bymodulating the effective connectivity from early
visual cortex to themotion-sensitive areas in visual cortex [50]. In both cases, the functional mechanism underlying the
cognitive process lies in neurons, or groups of neurons, communicating via axons and coordinated activity.
The key differences are (i) the scale of the explanation, which does not inherently make an explanation more or
less mechanistic, and (ii) the specific function that wewish to explain (orientation tuning ormotion detection), which
can determine the scale of explanation that is most appropriate. While this distinction has been noted by philosophers
[1], neuroscientists tend to favor the scale of their work as the scale with strongest mechanistic explanations. This
bias is in some sense quite rational; neuroscientists should work at the scale they believe is the most fruitful, and a
good explanation at one scale need not derive from a good explanation at another scale [1]. However, a key problem
with hegemony of a single scale is that good mechanistic explanations in neuroscience can also integrate across all
scales, interdigitating data across various methods [1]. Thus, we must be open to explaining the brain at each scale
mechanistically, and also deriving explanations of brain mechanisms that bridge phenomena across two ormore scales.
The notion that no specific scale of scientific investigation is privileged in terms of its capacity to provide amecha-
nistic explanation is also broadly understood across a range of disciplines. But perhaps the discipline that most cleanly
discusses the notion – and has the longest history of utilizing it to understand our world – is the field of physics [51].
General relativity offers fundamental laws that are required to providemechanistic explanations on the cosmological
scale. Newtonianmechanics offers fundamental laws that are required to providemechanistic explanations on the scale
of phenomena observable by the naked human eye. Quantummechanics offers fundamental laws that are required to
providemechanistic explanations on the atomic scale. But the specific form of themechanism or explanation important
for one scale is irrelevant at other scales. Scales are related to one another and yet mechanistic explanations at one
scale can be independent of those at another scale; macroscopic observables at a larger scale showweak dependence
onmicroscopic details at any of the scales below [52].
This perspective is particularly useful whenwe consider the types of mechanistic explanations that we can seek
in neuroscience. Reduction and coarse-graining –which we often use tomove up scales from individual cells to brain
regions – do not either increase or decrease our potential to unearthmechanisms. Instead, they extend the spatial or
temporal extent over which themechanistic explanation holds true, even if one does not reduce to the other, similar to
Newtonian andQuantummechanics. Take spatial navigation. As Craver puts it: “The influx of Ca2+ ions (atoms) through
the NMDA receptor (molecules) initiates the sequence of events leading to LTP (cells), which is part of themechanism
BERTOLERO &BASSETT 9
for forming a spatial map in the CA1 region (organs). Map formation is part of the explanation for how themouse (whole
organism) navigates through familiar environments (ecosystems) and among conspecifics and predators (societies)” [1].
Themicroscale, mesoscale, andmacroscale explanations differ in their content and supporting evidence, but all remain
mechanistic in their type, despite the fact that they do not easily reduce to one another. Instead, they all constrain the
ways in which we think about themechanisms underlying the behavior.
4 | NETWORK EXPLANATIONS AT THE LARGEST SCALE
At the largest scale, network sciencemodels the brain as approximately 100 to 1000 regions that are connected either
physically by white matter tracts or statistically by shared information between regional time series [8]. It is therefore
particularly relevant to consider the question of how such large-scale networkmodels can offer high-level mechanistic
explanations of how the brain works. This question has been extensively covered by philosophers [53, 54, 15, 55]. Thus,
what we seek to do here is to offer a practical perspective, with recent and prominent examples from the field. Wewill
constrain ourselves to two broad questions: (i) whywe should view network neuroscience as offering both parsimonious
mere descriptions andmechanistic explanations of brain function, and (ii) how canwe decipher between the two, given
the above definition of mechanism.
A particularly notable strength of large-scale network neuroscience lies in its ability to study every region of the
brain in a single cohesive model, providing intuitions for the functions of complete circuits. A disadvantage is that much
local information about the processes that occur or the structures that exist within a node are largely hidden. Such
internal processes and structures are instead considered bymodels constructed at lower scales, where – particularly in
non-human species – one canmeasure individual neurons in a region, oblate neurons in that region, and genetically
modify the organism to alter the structure of that region to probe local functions.
To further appreciate the utility of network science, it is useful to contrast the types of explanations it can offer with
the types of explanations offered by other approaches, and to the assess which types of explanations neuroscientists
find satisfying. Let us consider cognitive neuroscientists as an example. Typically, theymight seek answers to questions
such as: how does a brain region (or a set of brain regions) execute a particular cognitive process? For example, how does
the hippocampus store and represent spatial information? How does the orbital frontal cortex represent value? Now
imagine that – for every cognitive process – we have obtained a satisfactorymechanistic explanation. When someone
asks us how the brain works, do we simply hand them this list of so-called explanations? Such a list would be a valuable
start, but a set of independent mechanistic explanations in different conceptual languages of disjoint processes cannot
fully explain how the brain, as a whole, works. Ideally, wewish to have a language in which to comprehend the function
of the entire brain, and this is explicitly what network science has the potential to offer.
Before explaining how network neuroscience can provide mechanistic explanations of the brain, it is important
to note that network models at the large-scale can offer simplified mere descriptions of the above brain-behavior
relationships. A particularly notable simplification is in a study that reports a significant link between the presence
of a pattern of whole brain connectivity within each individual tomany behavioral (workingmemory capacity, spatial
reasoning) and demographic (education, income, IQ, life-satisfaction) measures in those individuals using canonical
correlation analysis [56]. Measures that were correlatedwith the presence of the connectivity pattern tended to be
positive personal qualities or indicators (e.g., high performance onmemory and cognitive tests, life satisfaction, years
of education, income). Measures that were anticorrelated with the presence of this pattern tended to be negative
personal qualities or indicators (e.g., those related to substance use, rule breaking behavior, anger). This set of findings
suggests that theremay be a general pattern of healthy brain function associatedwith a specific pattern of network-level
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connectivity. In the same vein, network neurosciencemodels have the ability to reduce the complexity of descriptions
of howmental illnesses emanate from the brain, and to discover dimensions of mental illnesses that neither regional
studies nor behavioral analyses can uncover [57]. Network approaches have proven useful in discovering biotypes
that cannot be differentiated solely on the basis of clinical features, but that are associatedwith differing profiles of
clinical symptoms or treatment response [58, 59]. Here, the strength of a network model lies in the fact that it can
describe connectivity patterns thatmap in a non-trivial but still simpleway to all behaviors. Suchmodels provide striking
descriptions, but not explanations, of brain function [60]. Tomove from description to explanation requires that the
description offer evidence for a mechanistic model; for example, if themodel predicted the above correlations, then the
correlations would be evidence in favor of themodel.
In addition to offering parsimonious descriptions, networkmodels at the large-scale can be used to generate and
test macro-level mechanisms of how the brain works. Note here that much of the evidence involves correlations in
empirical data or the results of numerical simulations. However, unlike the studies described in the previous sections,
whatwe empirically or in silicoobserve about humanbrain networks is tested against amechanisticmodel, not presented
in isolation as amere description. Consider a candidatemechanistic explanation of global brain function, which posits
that some regions are informationally encapsulated while other regions are informationally integrated [61]. Let us
suppose that the function of a given module (A) is largely independent of other modules. Then, we would expect
to observe that the activity of module A would not increase when other modules were active. If instead we were
to observe that the activity of module A increases in proportion to the number of other modules active, we would
conclude that information from these other modules is relevant to module A, causing an increase in computational
complexity and thus activity. In this case, we would infer that information processing in module A is unlikely to be
encapsulated [61]. In our model, regions whose activity scales with the number of modules engaged in a task are likely
to be executing computations that aremore complex, requiring the integration of information acrossmodules or the
tuning of connectivity across modules.
Recently, we explicitly tested this model in empirical fMRI data from 10,000 experiments and 83 different cognitive
tasks ranging from simple finger tapping to working memory. A network is constructed in which brain regions are
represented as nodes and correlations in regional activity are represented as network edges. Modules are defined
as groups of brain regions with dense interconnectivity. We determined how activity within eachmodule varied with
the number of modules engaged in each task. We report that modules composed of primary regions implicated in
vision, sensation, andmotion do not increase in activity in proportion to the number of modules involved across the
83 tasks. In light of our model, this behavior suggests that those modules are informationally encapsulated [40]. In
contrast, frontoparietal and attentionmodules, which is wheremost connector hubs are located, do increase in activity
in proportion to the number of modules involved across the 83 tasks. In light of our model, this behavior suggests that
thesemodules are not informationally encapsulated but instead perform computationally demanding functions when
moremodules are engaged in a task. The data support the notion thatmodules withmany connector hubs integrate
information or tunewhole brain connectivity [40].
In this example, empirical evidence and a networkmodel are used to test one of themost debated hypotheses in
neuroscience and philosophy of mind [61, 62, 63]. The network represents correlations in regional activity. Moreover,
themechanistic model makes a correlative prediction: that the level of activity in frontoparietal and attentionmodules
is positively correlated with the number of modules engaged in the task, whereas the level of activity in sensorimotor
modules is not correlatedwith the number of modules engaged in the task. Despite the fact that both data andmodel
involve correlations, the explanation of how the network functions is mechanistic, with connector hubs doing the
mechanistic work of integrating information and tuning whole brain connectivity, which allows other modules to remain
relatively independent.
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A potential mechanistic explanation that is more local but still quite global seeks to address the function of the
unencapsulated connector hubs. Connections from such regions are relatively evenly spread across all modules, making
them ideally located to tune connectivity between and among other modules [64]. In a series of cross-subject analyses,
including a quasi-experimental structural equation model [28], a recent study we conducted offered evidence that
these nodes do indeed tune (borrowing the term from its common use at the neuronal scale [65]) the connectivity
of other networks, thereby maintaining the network’s modular structure [25]. Critically, the more connector hubs
were able to tune the network to bemodular, the better the subject performed on a range of 50 distinct cognitively
demanding tasks. We then gathered merely descriptive experimental evidence suggesting that connector hubs are
densely interconnected to each other, forming a diverse club[41]. Moreover, when connector hubs are damaged,
modularity decreases [26] and cognitive deficits are widespread [27]. Then, in a series of numerical experiments, we
simulated evolutionary algorithms to obtain evidence that this club is only naturally selected if the cost function balances
modularity and efficient integration [41]. This result evidences the previously discussedmechanistic explanation that
these connector hub nodes coordinate connectivity betweenmodules tomaintain themodular structure of the brain
while also supporting integration. Note here that machine learning in the form of a deep neural networkwas used to
relate connector hub function to cognitive performance across individuals. But, suchmachine learning algorithms do
not constitute mechanisms on their own; to reach towards mechanism, wemust posit and test a mechanistic model.
This work posited amechanistic model that predicted the ability of connector hub function to predict cognition, which
was confirmed via machine learning. In sum, we gathered correlative, necessitative, and description evidence to support
a mechanistic model.
The tuning function of connector hubs can be contextualized as a network science language explanation of known
mechanisms of cognitive control, which is a capacity observedmostly in frontoparietal connector hubs to exert top-
down influence over other areas of cortex. Recent evidence supports this putativemechanism by demonstrating that
motor skill learning induces a growing autonomy of sensorimotor systems accompanied by a decrease in the activation
of cognitive control hubs [66]. Early in learning, the visual andmotor sub-networks are highly interconnected, and the
connector hubs in cognitive control areas are highly active, potentially tuning and parsing connectivity betweenmodules.
Later in learning, the hubs are no longer required and themodules become disconnected andmore autonomous. The
faster this occurs, the faster the individual learns. Several recent studies across many different laboratories now
provide additional evidence associating non-primary regions (especially but not solely in frontoparietal cortex) with
both network reconfiguration and behavior on tasks demanding higher order cognitive function [67, 68, 69, 70, 71].
The capacity for frontoparietal regions to enact this network-level control has been posited to stem from the specific
pattern of white matter connections emanating from those regions to the rest of the brain [72]. Specifically, using
network control theory [73, 74], the regions of the brain predicted by their pattern of white matter connections tomost
easily induce difficult state transitions in system function are located in frontoparietal areas. In further support of this
hypothesis, individuals whose brains have greater network controllability (as calculated from the theory parameterized
by their uniquewhitematter connectivity) also have greater cognitive performance in general [75] and cognitive control
in particular [76, 77]. Collectively, these studies support the notion that network control, instantiated on humanwhite
matter connectivity, provides amechanistic explanation for cognitive control, and its associated influence on the activity
and connectivity of other areas.
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F IGURE 2 Amulti-scale networkmodel of relationships within and between scalesMulti-scale networks are a
natural language in which to simultaneously model networks that exists at different scales in the brain. Here, edges
within a scale indicate interactions between those two nodes within a scale, while edges between two scales indicate an
interaction between those two nodes across scales. In this example, regional brain connectivity exists at the
macro-scale, visual cortex connectivity at themeso-scale, and V1 neuronal connectivity at themicro-scale. Here, the
connectivity of a node at themacro-scale could impact the connectivity of a node at themeso-scale, which could impact
the connectivity of a node at themicro-scale.
5 | BRIDGING SCALES WITH NETWORKS
Finally, it is critical to note that networks form a single and naturalmathematical languagewithwhich to frame questions
within and across multiple scales of neural function. The benefit of framing mechanistic questions with this math is
that the units involved are clearly specified, the edges between units within a scale are the channels along which work
can be done, and the edges between scales allow the units in one scale to dowork on the units in other scales. In other
words, multi-scale networks provide a scaffold onwhich causal inter-scale dynamics can occur, allowing us to generate
parsimoniousmultiscale descriptions andmechanistic explanations.
Take vision as an example: one can explain much – but not all – of vision by what occurs in visual cortex. While
artificial neural networks can reproduce some functions of cells in visual cortex [78], those functions also depend on the
activity and function of other parts of cortex. For example, vision cannot be completely explained without also including
amodel of attentional inputs from frontal cortex. Yet, the computational language that we use to explain the cellular
functions of vision (convolutional neural networks) is not the same computational language that we use to explain the
regional functions of attention (top-down control and gating theories). The lack of a common language in which to frame
explanations across scales and functions holds the field back; we can construct a list of such disjoint explanations, but at
the end of the day they remain just that, a list. What wewould instead like to have is a set of interdigitated explanations
fromwhich we can deduce themechanisms bywhich scales and functions causally impact one another.
Network science provides a common language with which to interdigitate explanations. By encoding the brain as
a network, we can reason about vision processes in occipital cortex and attentional processes in frontal cortex using
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the same language. Moreover, we can reason about how the regional network underpinning attentional processes in
frontal cortex can causally impact the cellular network underpinning visual processes in occipital cortex, largely because
network science has specific tools for multi-layers networks that involve links between the layers. These inter-scale,
inter-function connections in amultilayer network encoding of the brain can comprise the conduits along which work
can be done. We canmodel howmacro-scale network interactions, like connector hub tuning, influencemicro-scale
interactions, like neural tuning in V1, in a singlemodel. If, however, the two phenomenawere not translated into the
same language (such as the language of network science), this knowledge would remain out of reach.
A notable secondary benefit of the shared language is that we can begin to deduce general principles of brain
function shared across scales and functions. Perhaps cellular-level tuning functions in visual cortex share similar
mechanisms with regional-level tuning functions that connector hubsmay enact to control brain-wide connectivity. As
we described earlier, we can use the language of network science to formalize the notion that connector hubs have the
capacity to tune connectivity for integration in amodular network, and this notion provides a possible mechanism for
the commonly studied process of top-down attentional control. We can speculate that neural tuning, both within visual
cortex and across the cortex, is a general principle of brain function: primary regions tune for sensory, association, or
motor information, while transmodal regions (here, connector hubs) tune for connectivity patterns that allow for that
information to be integrated across modular processors. By articulating explanations across scales in the same network
language, we can begin to test such speculations with the goal of discovering general principles of brain function that
exist across scales, and distinguishing them from principles that exist at only a single scale.
The reasonableness and biological plausibility of interdigitated explanations are particularly salient when one
considers evolution. The processes of natural selection did not drive the evolution of single regions independently,
but instead led to the formation of the entire brain simultaneously. While visual cortex exists so that organisms can
see, the brain exists so that organisms can create offspring who have a high probability of reproducing themselves.
Moreover, visual cortex develops alongside and dependent on cascades of neurodevelopmental processes that span the
entire brain. In other words, both visual cortex and other areas of cortex experience some of the same evolutionary
pressures, impacting cellular and regional scales, which could drive similar patterns of connectivity across scales and
across regions. The notion that shared causes can drive shared patterns of connectivity can also provide insight as we
consider neural systems across species. As described earlier, modular connectivity patternswith a diverse club of tightly
interlinked connector hubs have been identified in the cellular network of neurons in C. elegans as well as the regional
network of areas in the human brain; it may be that this architecture is nature’s solution to integration in a modular
network.
Of course it is important to admit that network science is not the only mathematical language with which to
describe the brain. Yet, network science hasmarked advantages over other options in part because of its authenticity;
nometaphors are needed to link the physical organ of the brain to themathematics of network science. The brain is
a network, across species, and across scales. But perhaps it is worth also acknowledging that brains are extremely
complicated networks. It requires a formal theoretical apparatus like network science to represent the brain in a way
that is intelligible to us and in a way that allows us to link network features to one another and to behavior, compare
brains across species, and simulate the evolution of networks to better understand the reasons for their architecture.
6 | CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the strength of network neuroscience is that it can take complex networks and reduce this complexity by
describing the network succinctly. Network concepts help us to turn themessy reality of the brain into quantitative
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variables that make the search for correlations that confirmmechanistic models tractable. Correlational analyses in
network neuroscience can provide evidence in support of causalmechanisms, particularlywhen combinedwith analyses
that demonstrate necessity. Efforts to test mechanistic models via diverse types of analyses can provide diverse types
of evidence. Critically, because themechanistic explanations in human network neuroscience are framed in a language
that we can also use to study how neurons work at the smaller scales of visual cortex or simpler organisms, it is possible
to obtain general principles of brain function that are true across scales.
More generally, it is of fundamental importance to understand and articulate the nature of explanations that are
accessible to distinct areas of science and their associated experimental, computational, or theoretical approaches. Here
we have attempted to clarify the distinctions between an explanation and the evidence supporting that explanation.
Moreover, we have sought to distinguish between amechanism and the scale at which that mechanism exists. Drawing
on extensive work in the field of philosophy, we have framed our discussion largely within the context of emerging
approaches from network science that are proving particularly interesting and satisfying for many neuroscientists [79].
In the future, we envision increasing clarity on the networkmechanisms that are pertinent to brain function at large
scales, intermediate scales, and small scales, and a broadly held positive valuation of mechanisms irrespective of scale.
We also envision increasing clarity on howmechanisms at one scale interdigitate withmechanisms at the scale above
and the scale below, fostered by network analyses that formalize the scales in the same language and provide a language
to link scales to one another. Another way we see neuroscience progressing in the coming years is that our macro-scale
findings can guidemicro-scale analyses that involve necessitative evidence or manipulations. Finally, we hope that this
work serves as an example of how precise language and distinctions from the philosophy of science can be combined
with recent advances in neuroscience to propel the field forward.
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